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In his article The Punitive Coma[1] J.C. Oleson presents a radical solution to the burning issue of over-
crowded, violent and expensive prisons in the United States. Oleson proclaims: “The warehouse prison
doesn't incapacitate prisoners from committing further offences; it merely insulates them from the respect-
able taxpaying public. Like its medieval predecessors, the modern warehouse prison is built to contain soci-
ety's unwanted souls. Nothing more.”[2] The author nevertheless proposes a system that goes further than
this; in his suggested facility, efficient storing would be made perfect. Indeed, he advocates putting prisoners
into a narcotic coma for the duration of their sentences.
After presenting his idea of punitive coma, the author then outlines the technical possibilities of placing
a person into an induced coma, describing precisely the technical and medical requirements as well as the
potential risks and the ways to reduce them. He argues that suspending a prisoner's consciousness would
make it possible to pack each one into a limited space with a minimum level of staff and thus a minimum of
costs. Moreover it would be virtually impossible for the inmates to commit any crime against the other in-
mates or the correction officers.
Oleson claims that “the punitive coma is an enlightened form of punishment, as it is more efficient and
compassionate than the legitimized methods of punishment currently in use.”[3] He argues that this form of
punishment neither violates prisoners' constitutional rights nor the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment and outweighs any other moral threshold.
Many people would argue that the proposal to comatose prisoners is such an unacceptable idea that it is
not worth dealing with. However, I consider it very important to respond to this unusual suggestion for the
following reasons. First, I think Oleson's proposal is such an indication of the degradation and dehumaniza-
tion of prisoners that it should not be published without any reaction from a criminal lawyer. Second, the
public might find his proposal very tempting because it promises to make prisons much safer and especially
much cheaper. Therefore, I hold it necessary to give a thorough account of various moral, legal and social
objections to the replacement of conventional prisons with the permanent state of an artificial coma.
The Problems of the Modern Prison
The idea of imprisonment as punishment is quite modern. Although prisons can be found early in most
civilizations, they were usually used only to keep the accused in custody until trial. In Europe until late me-
dieval times, crime used to be a private matter, which was solved in a civil law case. The offender or his
clan had to compensate for the damage and, in more serious cases, revenge was sought in feuds. Later, when
the state claimed the monopoly over violence, individual body punishment was introduced, mainly in cruel
public executions and mutilations.[4] The kind of corporal punishment was supposed to reflect the crime and
its cruelty. It not only served as a general deterrent but demonstrated the power of the state.
Two changes characterize modern penology: first, the public nature of punishment was replaced by
secret and private executions. Second, the object of punishment shifted from the individual's life and body to
his[5] property and personal liberty. The prison as an institution of punishment was thus born.
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Oleson wants to solve two major problems of modern prisons, violence and high operational expenses.
He spends a considerable amount of space in his article describing the repugnant and violent conditions of
American warehouse prisons, with frequent torture and rape, high rates of suicide, and even killings commit-
ted or initiated not only by prisoners but even by prison guards. He claims that “our warehouse prisons are
animal factories” that are “affirmatively dehumanizing and brutal.”[6]
However, violence in prisons is a problem that should be addressed other than by merely robbing the in-
mates of their consciousness. The Stanford Prison experiment[7] demonstrated that there is a high violence
potential in everybody, regardless of whether or for what reason one is convicted and whether one is a pris-
oner or a prison officer. This well known experiment suggests that the institution of imprisonment itself
bears the roots of the high crime and violence rate in prison. The conclusion that must be drawn is that the
very concept of “imprisonment” needs to be reconsidered. If a society starts fighting violence by simply
transforming people into unconscious objects, it misses the chance to develop strategies to understand, pre-
vent or at least reduce aggression in the first place.
According to Oleson, besides prison violence, the most compelling problem is the high cost of operating
and constructing new prisons to cope with the rapid increase of prison population in the last three decades.
The amount of money spent on correctional facilities is enormous,[8] and, of course, diminishes public
spending elsewhere; Wray, for example, suggests that the increasing spending on prisons leads to substantial
cuts in education.[9] Oleson, on the other hand, estimates that in his proposed coma-bay facility the costs
could be cut drastically: the staff required for a 1000 man unit would be only eight nursing aides, two full-
time licensed practical nurses, a physician's assistant and an anesthesiologist, to feed, clean, medicate the
prisoners and prevent any side-effects of narcotic comas. By little more than doubling the personnel budget,
the numbers of prisoners could be increased from 1,000 to 10,000 inmates.[10] However, this calculation
does not take into account the risks of technical problems. If there were an accident and a number of prison-
ers “awoke” at the same time, a shortage in staff might be fatal. Furthermore, prisoners cost society the
highest amount after they have been released, due to the high rate of recidivism. According to Levitt, the
year after release from prison, a prisoner costs society approximately $80,000 because he will find it hard to
find a job and quickly commits crimes again.[11] This figure would probably be much higher for inmates
leaving coma-bay prisons, since they have no chance of rehabilitation or employment. Furthermore, Oleson
does not consider the loss of jobs and infrastructure now related to prisons. Gonnerman describes prisons as
“the North Country's largest growth industry” during the last 20 years.[12]
Deterrence and Retribution
Oleson argues that the four classic theories of punishment-retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and in-
capacitation-do not form a coherent system of penology but rather compete with each other. He claims that
prison “is a construction without a clear theoretical mandate.”[13] Nonetheless, Oleson argues that the pun-
itive coma “serves the same goals of deterrence and retribution.”[14]
In most societies the core of criminal justice is the notion that a committed wrong has to be put right by
retribution. Often, in connection with religion, there is the sense that by imposing suffering on the perpetrat-
or, the “good order” has to be reinforced, rebalancing the scales of justice. In many cases this is also the vic-
tim's first interest. According to retributive theories, punishment is the morally necessary response to crime.
Retributive punishment is seen as an end itself, which serves no other purpose than in responding to the viol-
ation of the victim's rights with the violation of the offender's rights. Consequently, it is crucial that the pun-
ishment is proportional to the crime.[15] The difficulty of finding a sentence proportional to the committed
crime is not a question of the form of punishment but rather of the process of sentencing itself and thus a
problem for the courts. A prison sentence does not become more or less proportional if the prisoner is put in-
to a narcotic coma.
Another problem with proportionality is that a sentence served in a state of unconsciousness might be
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seen as paradoxically both too hard or too lenient at the same time. As this Article will later demonstrate, the
punitive coma is much crueler than conventional prisons and thus out of proportion to any committed crime.
However, I am sure that many people, especially the victims or their families, would find the idea that the
perpetrator “sleeps”-while they have to live with the suffering-as unbearably lenient. Although I disagree,
some might conclude that a coma is less severe than the hard reality of overcrowded prisons. In this case,
retribution would not be well served.[16]
The utilitarian deterrence theories hold that the act of punishing a crime can prevent the criminal from
reoffending (individual deterrence) and discourage the rest of the society from committing a crime (general
deterrence). Indeed, one might well think that the experience of the loss of his life was so horrible that he
would not ever want to repeat it and would not commit any crime again. However, especially in cases of
longer sentences in the coma-bay prisons, the effect might be directly the opposite. When the prisoner is re-
leased after several years, the world he used to know might be so much changed that he would hardly recog-
nize it. I invite the reader to remember the world of 20 years ago. In 1986 the Cold War was at its height;
people would communicate by post instead of emails and use telephones instead of mobile phones. Given
the current difficulties of reintegrating long-term prisoners in society, the reintegration of the once-comatose
former prisoner would be much less likely than today, and he might well return to his criminal lifestyle.[17]
More importantly, both individual deterrence and general deterrence are undermined by the limited role
the prospect of punishment plays at the time of commission of the crime. One can divide the majority of
committed crimes into two categories. In the first, the offender believes that the chances of getting caught
are slim and hopes to avoid any punishment, no matter how light or severe it is. In the latter, the offender is
in such an emotionally excited state that his focus is merely on the crime as such, and he is not open to ra-
tional evaluation of any further consequences. In the former situation, certainty of punishment would prob-
ably prevent a considerable number of people from offending.[18] In the latter, there is no room for de-
terrence through the threat of punishment no matter how severe it is. The threat of punishment might only
indirectly affect the decision of whether to offend by, for example, raising society's condemnation and, con-
sequently, elevating offender's moral threshold.
Human Rights
The achievement of the Enlightenment movement is the common notion that no human shall be made an
object of state power but will always be certain of his dignity. Today, “civilization” means that even en-
emies of society are treated respectfully because we do not want to respond to barbaric behavior with bar-
baric treatment. We claim to behave humanely by treating everybody, criminals included, as humans.
Oleson, in contrast, while explaining how to reduce medical risks, suggests that the “coma-bay prisoner
should be thought of as a (living) machine, with inputs and outputs.”[19]
The reader should realize that Oleson proposes to transform human beings into objects with no con-
sciousness, who are little more than their physical bodies. One has to be clear about what it means to be put
into and kept in an artificial coma. It is not just a state of peaceful sleep, as the author tries to let us assume.
Transforming criminals into mere objects is dehumanising in the truest sense of the word. It means that the
person is not able to exercise any human activity, even simple things such as speaking to a friend, reflecting
on one's day or simply having daydreams. Oleson illustrates himself how inhuman coma-bay prisons would
be:
Although rehabilitation is dead in American corrections, its vestiges linger and consume a significant
fraction of our resources. Since coma-bay prisoners will remain unconscious, supplementary services
like counseling, libraries, or education can be eliminated from corrections budgets. Space-inefficient
features such as weight rooms, exercise yards, and visiting facilities can be eliminated entirely, allowing
the coma-bay prison administration to fit additional inmates into each facility.[20]
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Only in his conclusion does Oleson mention that punitive coma “denies a fundamental value of Anglo-
American jurisprudence: the physical integrity of the individual. It compromises human dignity.”[21] But
besides this single brief mention, there is no reference to this criticism.
In Oleson's coma-bay prison inmates are denied the basic human rights despite their being unconscious
and thus unaware of their situation. The comatose prisoner cannot express his opinion, enjoy education,
communicate with his family, inform himself about the latest politics, associate with others, be legally
counseled; he is not even allowed to talk, to pray, or even just to think. I hold that all human rights are viol-
ated, because the prisoner is not allowed any longer to be a human. Even the right of physical integrity is re-
stricted, since it embraces not only the lack of injury and pain but also the right to control and to use the
body. Indeed the right to life itself is disregarded, because the permanent unconscious state can hardly be
called human life. Moreover, the prisoner will be aware of what he has lost once he is allowed to regain con-
sciousness.
Oleson argues that the considerable advantages of comatosing prisoners justify the denial of constitu-
tional rights. He examines possible violations of freedom of speech (including communication by mail, tele-
phone access, and communication with the press), of the right of assembly (including visitation), the right to
free exercise of religion, and the right to counsel. The author follows two lines of argument. First, he shows
that American courts tend to grant prison administrations a broad discretion to restrict prisoners' rights and
are very reluctant to interfere in prison officials' scope for decision making. Thus Oleson expects that:
As long as reasonable attention is paid to the overall condition of confinement (that is, as long as co-
matose prisoners are physically well cared for), administrative encroachments upon secondary entitle-
ments-for example, the right to free speech, the right to assembly, or the right to practice one's religion-
will not warrant judicial intervention.[22]
But as Douglas v. Sigler[23] stated: “the courts will not interfere with the conduct, management and dis-
ciplinary control of this type of institution except in extreme cases.”[24] Putting prisoners into a narcotic
coma for the time of their sentence would indeed be a very extreme case. Even when it is said that “courts
are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform,”[25] the
intent is not to exclude all judicial review and give all the decision-making power to the administration.[26]
And this is for a good reason, because imprisonment is a very important part of political power, and thus in a
system of separation of powers the judiciary has to control the executive in this area.
Secondly, Oleson argues that the benefits of coma-bay prisons outweigh the already restricted constitu-
tional rights of prisoners and justify their elimination:
Already, these rights are dramatically truncated. The additional gains in safety and security realized by
using the punitive coma will certainly outweigh any additional losses to inmate liberty. It is simply a
matter of calculating the logistical issues, and ensuring that prisoners are not unnecessarily stripped of
their limited rights to speech, assembly, religion, and legal representation.[27]
Of course prisoners cannot enjoy the same rights as free citizens,[28] but American courts have re-
peatedly made it clear that prisoners' rights have to be balanced against penological interests[29] and that the
former should be given considerable weight. One aspect of this evaluation is the question of whether there
are alternative means for the prisoners to exercise their rights.[30] Obviously, this is not the case if the in-
mate is kept in coma.
Oleson's argument that punitive coma does not violate the U.S. Constitution is not quite coherent. He
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admits that prisoners have rights under the Constitution, even if those are restricted: “and precisely because
American prisoners do remain some rights, it must be determined whether the punitive coma will withstand
legal attacks raised in U.S. courts.”[31] However, when examining these rights in particular, he only shows
that these rights are restricted but not how it is justified to deny them altogether.
A further problem not taken into account by Oleson is the effect of his scheme on spouses, chidren,
friends, and relatives outside the prison. Presently, every prison sentence affects and harms the prisoner's
community, especially his family.[32] Yet even a remote prisoner can play a role in a family in absentia;[33]
families even move near the prison to be closer to the prisoner.[34] In Procunier v. Martinez[35] the Su-
preme Court acknowledged that a prisoner's wife has an interest in communicating with him which is protec-
ted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Later, in Overton v. Bazzeta,[36] while upholding severe re-
strictions on visitation, the Court purposely stopped short of denying that some family members possessed
associational rights. Oleson's proposal would render impossible communication and association between in-
mates and intimate family members. Indeed, it would unbearable on prisoners and family to cut a prisoner
off completely from the family life and make it impossible for him to share important events like weddings
or deaths or to be asked his advice in important family decisions.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Arguing that the state of punitive coma is not unusual but rather innovative, and not more but rather less
cruel than the present crowded and violent prisons, the author infers that punitive coma does not violate the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment found in the Eight Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.[37]
His argument is that “[if] anything, the punitive coma is less cruel and less unusual than crowded warehouse
prisons or supermax facilities.”[38]
It is true that the unpleasant physical and psychological conditions under which the inmates have to try
to survive would be eliminated with punitive coma.[39] However, I argue that comatosing human beings is
even crueler than the present situation in prisons. Even if the inmates live under constant fear and in violent
struggle, they are able to behave as humans, to think, to pray, and to reflect about their past, present and fu-
ture actions. Even if one at a first glance thinks that at least the inmate has no pain, one has to agree that the
narcotic coma is worse than pain: it is like being buried alive.
Oleson asks us to imagine that we had to advise a convicted person whether to face violence and rape
for years, or a painless sleep. Although the latter option seems to very tempting in this scenario, one has to
remember that in extreme cases sometimes one even considers death to be the lesser evil. Still, we would not
advise people to commit suicide or even make a nationwide policy of it.
Prisons have been judged to be “cruel” if they deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measures of
life's necessities.[40] I argue that these “civilized measures” are more than food and health. I understand that
essential human practices, such as reading, writing, or founding a family, are not seen as fundamental neces-
sities; however, other basic human needs such as thinking or communicating with others are. It is not
enough to be fed and cleaned. Punitive coma is cruel because it deprives inmates of the exercise of their es-
sential humanity.
Since Oleson's proposal is a new idea and only possible now that medical science is advanced enough to
keep a human being in constant coma for such a long time, Oleson argues that coma-bay prisons are innovat-
ive rather than unusual. It can easily be acknowledged that the constitution of a country allows changes and
developments. However, it is the function of a constitution that certain rights are guaranteed and that the cit-
izens cannot be deprived of them even if society undergoes significant changes.[41] This is especially true
of the American Constitution, which can only be amended, but not changed. Each development has to be
considered very carefully in this light. I hold that the idea of taking away somebody's consciousness-and
thus excluding him from any human activity and putting him in a vegetable state-differs so much from any
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other known form of punishment that it is cruel and unusual indeed.
American Society
Oleson describes three approaches to tackling the problem of over-populated prisons: construction, di-
version and crowding. An approach that he does not consider at all is to try to reduce the number of people
being sentenced to prison in the first place. As well as crime being part of society, so are prisons. Especially
in the United States where the prison population is so incredibly high,[42] prisons are an essential problem
of society.
What is needed is an understanding of why so many American citizens are imprisoned. Do the roots of
the high prison population lie in the judicial system? According to Morgan, “[t]he rate of imprisonment is
not determined by factors beyond government control. It is ultimately a matter of political choice.”[43] Or
does the key lie in American social structure and organization?[44] Alternatively, could we draw conclu-
sions from the fact that by far the majority of American prisoners are extremely poorly educated, and most
have been unemployed before being imprisoned?[45]
One related factor behind the high prison population is the high rate of crime. Why does the U.S. have
such a high crime rate? Is American society more violent than that of other countries? If so, what are the
reasons for this? The comparison with other Western countries, of which none has nearly as many prisoners
as the United States, shows that there must be other ways of addressing crime. Oleson accuses conventional
prisons of being “an inefficient and ineffective means of controlling crime,”[46] but he does not show us
whether the punitive coma would affect the crime rate in any way.
A huge prison population as well as a high crime rate show that something must be wrong with the soci-
ety that is affected by them.[47] Thus, prisons are in the first place a social rather than an economic or tech-
nical problem, and what is needed is a social, not a medical, solution. The author illustrates very convin-
cingly how easily, safely and inexpensively new scientific methods can cope with the bad situation.
However, even the best science cannot heal growing cancers of society by putting plasters over the wounds.
Oleson counters that medical treatments are already used in criminal justice: “If medical procedures can be
used for punitive purposes, if we can punish sex offenders by chemically castrating them, then we can prob-
ably also incapacitate our most serious prisoners by placing them into narcotic comas.”[48] But involuntary
sterilization does affect only one part of the individual, not the person as a whole.[49]
Oleson comforts us by stating, “We may feel uncomfortable with punishing our offenders by treating
them with medical therapies (especially in the absence of any penological commitment to rehabilitation), but
we would shed these scruples with time.”[50] The thought that scruples would become weak over time
might be true but nonetheless cannot provide any justification. But it is not only the idea of a medical ap-
proach to a social problem that is disturbing. Storing prisoners together and packing them in the smallest
space cannot be a solution to crime. Rather than treating the symptoms, the roots of the problem have to be
researched and addressed.[51] Reducing the negative side-effects of imprisonment-crime rates within pris-
ons and high costs-might even worsen the problem, as it takes it out of sight of the public. Society has to
deal with its problem directly and not just hide them away, neither in conventional prisons nor in transform-
ing criminals into mere objects.
In modern Western views the conception still prevails that human beings can overcome their more an-
imalistic tendencies with human morals rather than just impair them with narcotics. It is humankind's chal-
lenge to overcome behavior that we classify as crime. We should not try to run away from this task. Martin-
son states that we have “denie[]d … both the normality of crime in society and the personal normality of a
very large proportion of offenders, criminals who are merely responding to the facts and conditions of our
society.”[52]
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Many of the problems addressed in conventional prisons, especially the violence among inmates, arise
in significant part because of the under-funding of prisons. However, the under-funding as such is not ad-
dressed by Oleson's article. Clearly, the United States is not so poor as not to be able to afford to spend more
money on prisons. It is not a question of funds as such, but rather of their distribution. In my opinion, the
reasons why prisons have such a small priority compared to other funded projects, even though the incred-
ible situation of prisoners is known, shows the small importance that is attributed to the prisoners them-
selves. When a system on the one hand produces such an enormous percentage of imprisoned citizens but on
the other hand refuses to fund prisons accordingly, it must be asked what society sees in its prisoners. An il-
lustration is provided by the statement of a neighbor of the new supermax prison in Malone, New York,
where two inmates share a 14-by-8.5-foot cell: “You have to be a total animal to be locked up like that … I
think it would drive me nuts. But we don't know who's going to occupy the cell. He probably deserves that
or worse.”[53]
The lack of interest in and respect for prisoners will even grow when inmates are completely cut off
from the outside world. At present, prisoners are still part of society, even if an unwanted one; but in coma-
bay prisons they would be completely excluded from society. Inmates will be out of sight of society and
they will not even be able to observe passively what is happening in the outside world.
This approach of getting unwanted people out of the sight of society could easily spread into other
areas. If a system decides to cope with the problem of crime, violence, and prisons with the proposed meas-
ures, it is only a small step to address other problems with the same methods. Why not put a mentally dis-
abled person in a coma until better treatments are found? And where is the line between mental illness and
mental handicap? Why not stop the suffering of seriously ill people by letting them sleep for an indefinite
time? What about other problematic groups of society, or those who are perceived as problematic by the
mainstream? Twenty years ago (and according to some people even today) homosexuals would be con-
sidered appropriate candidates. The same might be true for drug-addicted and later even unemployed or
homeless people. Treatments that most of us would reject because they remind us of Fascist practices in
Nazi Germany should not be allowed in the case of convicted criminals either.
The Criminal Justice System
Furthermore, Oleson's proposal would have important impacts on the criminal justice system. First, he
suggests that punitive coma may substitute for the death penalty. He argues that one of the benefits of punit-
ive coma is that, if a miscarriage of justice is detected, the inmate always can be released. I doubt if he could
convince retentionists, who now reject changing the death penalty into a mandatory life sentence without pa-
role, to agree to put prisoners into a lifetime sleep. But there is an additional concern: the number of cases in
which innocent people are sentenced to death allow us to infer wrongful convictions in cases of long-term
imprisonment. How can a convicted person who is rendered unconscious for years or even decades fight an
appeal case? He would be dependent on a lawyer or a friend to start an appeal case; he cannot take his own
initiative. But how could a lawyer question the prisoner? In a footnote Oleson tries to solve this problem by
suggesting that the prisoners could be awakened periodically “to participate in legal proceedings or parole
hearings.”[54] However, there is no consideration of the psychological impact that waking up would have on
the prisoner's psyche. Furthermore, is it very questionable whether the prisoner could give reliable state-
ments in a condition in which his thinking is reduced to a short time between long periods of unconscious-
ness. In addition, a drop in the number of appeals or re-opened cases could undermine in the long run the
awareness that misjudgments are possible.
What is more, the possibility of storing more people more cheaply in such facilities might cause the
prison population to rise. More effective ways of imprisonment as well as more efficient ways of handling
cases in courts, such as plea bargaining,[55] will not decrease but cumulatively accelerate the process of
locking people away, and both procedures would be paid for through the loss of individual rights.
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The criminal justice system would also have to reconsider the meaning of “life sentence.” In Oleson's
proposed system “the prisoner can be allowed to age and to die within the comatose state.”[56] But how
would this end occur, when all life functions are regulated by machines and the body does not act? What
does it mean to age: is this merely a question of decline of the cells? Should elderly people not have the op-
portunity to prepare mentally for death, speaking a last time with loved ones, receiving religious blessing,
sorting out legal maters like writing a will? Moreover, does the artificial coma shorten or lengthen a life-
time? If the latter, would there be a policy concerning after how many years the life supporting system
would be switched off? What would be the safeguards against misuse? Would there be a justification left not
to switch off the machine immediately to cut further costs, since “the thing called prisoner” does not notice
experience in his life anyway?
Conclusion
I agree with Oleson in that it is necessary and urgent to find alternatives to this inhuman institution of
imprisonment. However, the coma-bay prison is not an acceptable replacement, not only because it ignores
the inmates' constitutional rights and bears several serious risks for the criminal justice system as well as
broader society, but most of all because it deprives the prisoners of their human dignity. Regardless of the
crime which has been committed, we cannot allow this.
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test of reasonable restriction of prisoners' right to correspondence, which was also used for other
rights.
[FN30] See 482 U.S. 396.
[FN31] Oleson, 90 Cal. L. Rev. at 878.
[FN32] See, e.g., R. Pain & S. Gill, Where Can Children Turn?, 50 Criminal Just. Matters 16, 16
(2003).
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[FN33] Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987) (holding that inmates
have the right to marry).
[FN34] Gonnerman, supra note 12; Wray, supra note 9, at 52.
[FN35] Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974)
(overruled by, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1989)).
[FN36] Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S. Ct. 2162, 156 L. Ed. 2d 162, 6 A.L.R.6th 731
(2003).
[FN37] Oleson, 90 Cal. L. Rev. at 889. I completely agree with Oleson when he claims that narcotic
coma under these circumstances is to be categorised as punishment rather than medical treatment.
However I oppose his description of it as “a benign form of punishment.” 90 Cal. L. Rev. at 888.
[FN38] Oleson, 90 Cal. L. Rev. at 890.
[FN39] Although not all risks are excluded, see above.
[FN40] Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981).
[FN41] Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), judgment aff'd and remanded, 559 F.2d
283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted in part, judgment rev'd in part, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S. Ct. 3057, 57 L.
Ed. 2d 1114 (1978) (“The content of the Eighth Amendment is not static but ‘must draw its mean-
ing from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” ’).
[FN42] And long prison terms have increased over the last two decades notwithstanding sinking
crime rates.
[FN43] Rod Morgan, Imprisonment: Current Concerns and a Brief History since 1945, in The Ox-
ford Handbook of Criminology 1137, 1145 (Mike Maguire et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997).
[FN44] Steven F. Messner & Richard Rosenfeld, Crime and the American Dream (2d ed. 2001).
[FN45] Wray, supra note 9, at 54: “[T]here is a disturbingly high correlation between dropping out
of high school and becoming incarcerated, and between non-employment and becoming imprisoned
… [;] perhaps a third of all prime-age jobless males without a high school degree are currently un-
der control of the criminal justice system.”
[FN46] Oleson, 90 Cal. L. Rev. at 836.
[FN47] Morgan, supra note 43, at 1145, explains:
The modern prison, and its institutional counterpart-the workhouse for the indigent poor, the asylum for
the insane, the reformatory for wayward youth, and the penitentiary for fallen woman-reflect what Fou-
cault … has termed ‘the great confinement’ and emerged alongside the factory. They were social and ar-
chitectural counterparts. In the factories labour was rationalised for the purposes of more efficient pro-
duction. In the new institutions of confinement those unproductive sections of the labour force were dif-
ferentiated, segregated, and disciplined.
One cannot help asking what purpose our contemporary hopelessly overcrowded prisons do serve.
[FN48] Oleson, 90 Cal. L. Rev. at 896.
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[FN49] And the treatment is crime related.
[FN50] Oleson, 90 Cal. L. Rev. at 897.
[FN51] Messner & Rosenfeld, supra note 44, for example, see the reason for the enormously high
crime rate in American culture and social structure.
[FN52] Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 36 Pub. In-
terest 22, 49 (1974).
[FN53] Gonnerman, supra note 12.
[FN54] Oleson, 90 Cal. L. Rev. at 888 n.334.
[FN55] Mike McConville, Plea Bargaining, in The Handbook of Criminal Justice Process 353
(Mike McConville & Geoffrey Wilson eds., 2002).
[FN56] Oleson, 90 Cal. L. Rev. at 874.
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